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COMMENTS
TRUSTS - PERPETUITIES - RESTRAINTS ON
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the rule that
our statutory prohibition of undue restraints on the alienation of
property' is not violated as to property held in trust where the trustee
has the power to sell the property and replace it with other assets. 2 Since
this rule has been criticized as narrowing the policy foundations of the
common law rules which invalidate such restraints,3 a comparison of
the scope and purpose of the common law rules with the statutes de-
signed to replace or supplement them is in order.
I. COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST DIRECT RESTRAINTS
The first of the common law rules, in point of time, is the rule against
direct restraints on alienation. Such a direct restraint would be, for
example, a devise or grant to A in fee simple, but providing that A was
not to alienate the property until he reached a certain age.4 The Statute
Quia Emptores established the right of tenants holding in fee simple
to alienate their interest. As a corollary of this right, the courts de-
veloped the rule that a condition or limitation on the right to alienate a
fee simple estate is void ab initio." There are two reasons advanced for
the rule.
The first reason is that the restraint on alienation is repugnant to the
estate granted. The law of property recognizes only certain fixed types
of estates, and will not allow the creation of new ones because of the
confusion it would cause in determining where title lay. In fixing the
definition of a fee simple estate the courts assume that alienability is an
inseparable incident of that estate. Since public policy forbids the
creation of new estates, to avoid confusion of titles, and presuming that
alienability is a necessary incident of the fee simple estate, then to
recognize a restraint on alienation would be repugnant in the sense of
being inconsistent with the doctrine of fixed types of estates. 7 The
'Wis. STATS. (1951), sec. 230.14 "Suspension of the power of alienation.
Every future estate shall be void in its creation which shall suspend the ab-
solute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this
chapter; such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons
in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. Limitations
of future or contingent interests in personal property are subject to the rules
prescribed in relation to future estates in real property;. .. .
Sec. 230.15 "Limit of Suspension. The absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer period
than during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the
estate and thirty years thereafter ....
2 Will of Walker, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W. 2d 94 (1950).
3Note, 49 MicH. L. REv. 1239 (1951).
4 Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. 607, 69 N.W. 568 (1896).
518 EDW. 1, C. 1 (1290).
6 SnuEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. 439 (1936) (hereafter cited as SImEs).
7 Ibid., Sec. 442.
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other reason is the public policy in favor of keeping land in commerce
to meet the needs of the community.8 The latter is generally considered
the main reason for the rule in its modern application, though the courts
continue to base their decisions on the formal reasoning of repugnancy.
Since in some cases restraints on alienation have been permitted (spend-
thrift trusts and married women's separate estates) it seems that such
restraints cannot be truly repugnant if they are sometimes permissable. 9
The rule against direct restraints is applied to restraints on both legal
and equitable interests, but in America the majority of states allow
restraints on the alienation of equitable life estates in the form of spend-
thrift trusts.10 Massachusetts and Illinois have extended this rule, based
on the right of a settlor to dispose of his property as he wishes, to include
spendthrift trusts of beneficial fee interests" But usually any restraint
on either a legal or equitable fee interest is considered void as a restraint
on alienation.12 The courts in dealing with restraints on equitable in-
terests generally do not consider whether the subject matter of a trust
is sufficiently alienable if the trustee can sell the corpus and thus keep
it in commerce. The English rule against restraints on alienation of
equitable life estates was laid down in Brandon v. Robinson" where
the court said the gift to the beneficiary must have all the incidents of
the property given, and the attempt to deprive creditors of their rights
against the beneficiary's estate was void. Counsel argued that the
trustee, who had "an absolute interest," could dispose of the property,
but the court gave no direct answer on this point. The case seems to be
based on a policy of protecting creditors. 14 The Pennsylvania court first
considered the right of the trustee to sell trust property in validating a
spendthrift trust, but based its decision primarily on the right of the
settlor to dispose of his property as he chose.15 In Broadway Bank v.
Adams,'4 a leading case on spendthrift trusts, the court points out that
the property is not inalienable since the trustee has the full legal title,
including a power of sale.'7 However, the court also based its decision
on giving effect to the intent of the settlor and the view that the power
8 Ibid., Sec. 440; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, Sec. 220 (1951) (hereafter
cited as BOGART).
9 SIuirs, Sec. 442.
10 A spendthrift trust is usually a life estate or term for years given in trust,
which the beneficiary cannot voluntarily assign or convey, nor can it be
reached by his creditors. BOGERT, Sec. 222.
11 Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, 11 N.E. 163
(1916); Wagner v. Wagner, 249 Il. 101, 91 N.E. 66 (1910).
12 BOGERT, Sec. 220.
13 18 Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811).
14 It was so construed in Tillinghurst v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205 (1858).
'5 Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33 (1829).
16133 Mass. 170 (1882).
17 In most jurisdictions the trustee has no power of sale unless the trust
instrument specifically gives it to him. Leach, Powers of Sale in a Trustee,
47 HARV. L. REV. 948 (1934).
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of alienation is not a necessary incident to a life estate in real property.""
Except in the cases mentioned, the courts in considering direct
restraints on equitable interests do not look to the power of sale in the
trustee as an aid in determining alienability. The cases involving spend-
thrift trusts of equitable life estates are governed by either a policy of
favoring creditors or giving the settlor a free hand in the disposition of
his property.' 9 The cases involving equitable fees are decided on the
repugnancy ground.20
II. COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST INDIRECT RESTRAINTS
The other type of restraints against alienation is the indirect
restraint. An indirect restraint arises when an attempt is made to
accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but
with the incidental result that the action would, if valid, restrain practical
alienability. 2 These indirect restraints arise on the creation of two
types of future interests. 22 In one type there is an uncertainty as to the
person who will ultimately take the property; for instance, a grant to A
for life, remainder in fee to the heirs of B, a living person.23 Here there
is an uncertainty as to the person who will take the remainder since B's
heirs are not determined until B dies. Alienation is restrained because,
until B dies, there is no one who can combine with the possessor of the
present estate to convey a full fee simple. Although the grantor probably
did not intend a restraint there are no persons in being who can, by
acting together, convey the fee simple.2 4
The second type of future interest involving an indirect restraint is
when there is no uncertainty as to the person who has the future interest,
but it is uncertain when, and if, he will ultimately take the property;
for example, a grant to A in fee simple, but to C if A dies with no sons
surviving him.25 In such a situation the alienation technically is not
restrained for the future interest can be released by the person who
might eventually take the property as he is here determined. But here
the law aims at practical alienability so even this future interest is
Is Here the court followed Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 13 L.Ed. 254 (1875),
where Justice Miller held that the doctrine that income from trust property
could not be enjoyed by the beneficiary without being liable for his debts
was engrafted on the common law to protect creditors and is of compara-
tively modem origin. He did not agree with Lord Eldon (in Brandon v.
Robinson, supra, note 13) that the right of alienation is a necessary incident
of a life estate in real property.
It BOGERT, Sec. 222.
20 Ibid., Sec. 220.
21 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE POWER OF ALIENATION, Sec. 180 (2nd Ed., 1895).
22 SIMEs. Sec. 437.
23 See Thelluson v. Woodford, 11 Vesey Jr., 112 (1805), where the devise was
to the eldest male descendant of testator's son, Peter, at the death of the
survivor of seven sons and their sons.
24 SIMES, Sec. 479.
2- See the Duke of Norfolk's case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682), where an executory
interest was limited to C if T died during the lifetime of H without sons
surviving.
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regarded as an indirect restraint since it diminishes the probability of
the land being alienated until it can be determined if the holder of the
future interest will actually receive the property.26 Since the courts
looked, in both of these cases, to how long it would be before the future
interest invested, some writers have denominated this rule against in-
direct restraints as a rule against remoteness in vesting, but it is more
commonly called the rule against perpetuities. 27
The rule against perpetuities took form as a rule in the Duke of
Norfolk's Case's when Lord Nottingham held that a contingency which
was to be determined at the end of one life was all right, but stated that
he would not allow them if they would continue so long as to cause
"visible inconvenience." Later cases held that it was immaterial how
many lives were involved if all were in being at the time of the grant or
devise, 29 and then added a period of twenty-one years as a period of
minority 0 which later became a period in gross without reference to the
minority of any person.31
Thus the common law rule against perpetuities finally allowed future
interests to be created which would vest within lives in being and
twenty-one years. If it is possible that the future interest may not vest
within this time it is void, although vesting actually occurs in the time
allotted.
32
Though the rule is discussed in terms of vesting, its primary purpose
was always to promote alienability. 33 Alienability is impaired by an
indestructible interest in a person not presently ascertained or in a
person who .may never take possession of the property. The law has
determined that an indirect restraint for a selected, period, which has
been varied by statute in some states,34 is all right, but will not allow a
restraint if it may last longer than the period. Such restraints are
labelled perpetuities and are held void.3 5
The beneficial interest in a trust may contain a future interest which
will indirectly suspend the power of alienation, and so violate the rule
against perpetuities.3 6 A power of sale in the trustee is not accepted as
a reason for saving a trust containing a "perpetuity" in the beneficial
2 6 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 512 (1936).
27 Rundell, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, 19 MICH. L. REv.
235, 240 (1921); SIMEs, Sec. 479.28 Supra, note 25.
29 Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229 (1736).
30 Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. Temps. Talb. 228 (1736).
"I Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 362 (1833).
32 SIMES, Sec. 474.
33Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 512 (1936); SIMES, Sec.
474.
SIMES, Sec. 560.
35Ibid., Sec. 479; Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N.W. 899 (1910).3 6 Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 617, 53 N.W. 905 (1892); GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PERPETurrIEs, Sec.. 411 (Fourth Ed., 1942) (hereafter cited as GRAY).
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interest.37 Nor does the fact that the beneficiary can alienate his future
interest save it from being declared void if it might not vest within the
period allowed by the rule.
3 8
Since the courts and writers have usually held to the formal rules
based on remoteness of vesting, it appears that a power in a trustee to
alienate the items of a trust corpus will not save the trust from a
perpetuity in the beneficial interest under the common law rule, though
the basic purposes of the rule against restraints appears to be satisfied in
such cases. The lengths to which the courts will go in applying their
formal reasoning is shown in the English cases holding that a power of
sale that would arise in a trustee on an event which would occur beyond
the period of the rule against perpetuities was a restraint on alienation,
as it was a future interest which would not "vest" in the trustee within
the period of the rule.3 9
III. THE NEW YORK STATUTES
Both of these common law rules against restraints on alienation
existed in New York prior to 1830.40 In that year a new Real Estate
Code became effective. The code was the work of a commission of three
revisors who had been appointed to codify existing statutes concerning
real property.4 ' The code as finally completed covered areas where
previously there was no statute in effect. One of these areas was that of
restraints on alienation.42 The revisors stated the common law rule
against perpetuities as a rule against suspension of the power of
alienation, with a change in the period of allowable suspension. 43 In
Section 14 the revisors aimed at restraints caused by the creation of
future interests in persons not ascertainable until some future date.44
To cover cases where a future interest was given to an ascertained
person, but limited on an uncertain future event, they used the last
sentence of Section 24.45 Generally it can be said that the revisors
intended that their statutory rule would be only a f'estatement of the
common law rule as it existed in 1830," and their change in the rule's
language can be laid to their idea that the rule was aimed at those remote
37 GRAY, Sec. 269; Wheeler v. Fellows, 52 Conn. 238 (1884).
- GRAY, Sec. 269.
39 Goodier v. Johnson, 18 Ch. Div. 441 (1881).
40 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 515 (1936).
41 Ibid., 517; Rundell, supra, note 27, 565; 3 N.Y.R.S. (2d. ed.) 571.
42 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 515 (1936).
43 SimEs, Sec. 565.
44 NEw YoRic REVISED STATUTES, (1830), REAL ESTATE CODE, Sec. 14: "Every
future estate shall be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute
power of alienation for a longer period that is prescribed in this article.
Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being by
whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed."4- NEW YORK REvIsED STATUTES (1830), REAL ESTATE CODE, Section 24: "...And
a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a contingency which if it should occur,
must happen within the period prescribed in this article."Js Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 516 (1936).
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future interests which were restraints on alienation. The revisors did
not consider the rule as one against remoteness in vesting as such, but as
a rule against the suspension of the power of alienation, relying on the
statement in Scatterwood v. Edge4 7 that if all having an interest in
particular property can join to convey a fee simple then there is no
perpetuity. Hence, if each interest in the property was alienable there
was no violation of the statute.48 This view of the common law was
subsequently rejected in England in London Ry. v. Gomm4" as being an
old error, for the fact that the future interest is theoretically alienable is
of no help to the possessor of the present estate, when there is, prac-
tically speaking, no probability of such an alienation.5" The only change
in the common law intended by the revisors was a reduction of the
period allowed for a restraint to continue to only two lives in being,
eliminating the period in gross of twenty-one years, and permitting it
as a period of minority in only one instance.51
The statute was not intended by the revisors to replace the common
law rule against direct restraints, but it has been applied to direct
restraints by the New York court,52 although other cases still rely on
the common law rule against repugancy. 3 It is said that since the
courts, whether using the common law rule against direct restraints or
the statute, only hold the restraint void and not the grant itself, this
lends support to the view that the statue as applied to direct restraints
goes no farther than the common law rule against direct restraints.
54
In cases of indirect restraints the early decisions followed the
revisors' intent and did not find the statute violated simply because of
remoteness in vesting.55 But in 1909, the New York court in Matter of
Wilcox5 ' held that the revisors intended that there also be a continuance
of the rule against remoteness of vesting, and that the statute con-
tained both that rule and the rule against suspension of the power of
alienation. The court based its decision on Section 2451 of the Code
which it interpreted as a rule against remoteness, and did not consider
the previous cases 58 which held that alienation was suspended only when
4 Supra, note 29.
48 Graham v. Graham, 49 Misc. 4, 7 N.Y.Supp. 779 (1905) ; RUNDELL, supra note
27, 254.
19 L.R., 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882).
50 SIIIss, Sec. 567.
51 NEW YORK REVISED STATUTES (1830) REAL ESTATE CODE, Section 15: "The
absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or con-
dition whatever for a longer period than during the continuance of not more
than two lives in being at the creation of the estate ... "52 Re Walker's Will, 122 Misc. 905, 202 N.Y.Supp. 760 (1924).
53 Hacker v. Hacker, 153 App. Div. 270, 138 N.Y.S. 194 (1912).
- SIMES, Sec. 570; BOGERT, Sec. 219.
55 Sawyer v. Cubby, 146 N.Y. 192, 40 N.E. 869 (1895).
56 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909).
5 Supra, note 45.
58 Supra, note 55.
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there are no persons in being by whom an absolute estate in possession
can be conveyed. It seems that the present state of the New York law
is in accord with the later decisions under the common law rule against
perpetuities, 59 at least in so far as it holds that contingent future interests
suspend alienation.6" But the New York rule against remoteness in
vesting is even more stringent than the common law rule, as the allow-
able period is only for two lives.6 ' In addition, the court in the Wilcox
case62 also decided that "vesting" under the New York statute meant
vesting in possession and enjoyment, and not merely vesting in interest.
The rules laid down in the Wilcox case were applied to all future estates
in Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co.6 3 where the court stated
that the revisors intended that all future estates depending on a con-
tingency should vest in possession within a reasonable time.
The common law rule against perpetuities was always considered as
applying only to future interests," but in 1835 the New York court
applied their statutory form of the rule to a present trust interest, which
would last for the lives of twelve persons, saying that the statute applied
to all inalienable interests, whether present or future, and irrespective of
the cause of inalienability.65 The court reasoned that since the trustee
could not sell the property until the end of twelve lives the trust violated
the statute, although all three revisors appeared and argued to the
contrary. 6 A year later the court was faced with a trust giving the
trustee a power of sale, but here it concluded that sale of the trust
property by the trustee would not be a true alienation under the statute
unless the trustee also had the power to terminate the trust.6 7 The result
was that most trusts are invalid in New York if they may last for more
than two lives in being 6 8
IV. THE WISCONSIN STATUTES
Wisconsin adopted the New York Code in 1849 but without a
provision covering interests in personalty.69 In 1887 the period of
permissable suspension was increased from two lives in being to two
lives and twenty-one years.7 0 In 1925 the statute was amended so as to
-59London Ry. v. Gomm, supra, note 49.
60 SIMES, Sec. 567.
61 RUNDELL, supra note 27, 261.
62 Supra, note 56
63226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919).
64 RUNDELL, supra note 27, 250.
65 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835). The suspension of alienation, in
the case of trusts, results from another statute making the beneficiary's
interest inalienable. See BOGERT, Sec. 219.
66Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 517 (1936).
67 Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (1836).
CSBOGERT, Sec. 219.
69Wis. REv. STAT. (1849), ch. 56; Sec. 14-21, 23.
70 Wis. Laws (1887), ch. 551.
1952]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cover interests in personalty as well as realty.-' In 1927 the period was
again changed and it is now for any lives in being and 30 years.' 2
Prior to the dual rule laid down by the New York court in the
Wilcox case,73 the Wisconsin court adopted the position that our statute
was not aimed at remoteness in vesting as such but only at unlawful
restraints upon the power of alienation.7 1 "We adopt the doctrine that
the absolute power of alienation is not suspended within the meaning of
the statute so long as absolute power is located somewhere to alien-
ate .... ,,7" This doctrine was expressly reaffirmed by the court in 1941.',
"This court has declined to follow the court of appeals of the state of
New York and hold that the rule against perpetuities in this state
depends upon the remoteness of vesting. . . Forty years' experience
under the rule involved in Becker v. Chester does not seem to have
produced any undesirable results.177 Wisconsin is in accord with New
York, however, in applying the statute to present estates78 and to both
vested and contingent future estates.7 9
The Wisconsin court, following the lead of New York, has applied
our statutes to trusts.8 0 The early cases involved only trusts of income
of land since, until 1925, Wisconsin had no statutory or commion law
rule against perpetuities in personal property.8 The suspension of
alienation resulted from the fact that the beneficiary's interest in such a
trust is made inalienable under another statute.82 Since the latter does
not apply to trusts of income from personalty, 3 there would appear to
be no suspension of alienation in such trusts since 1925 except where
the beneficiaries are not ascertained. 4 Contrary to the New York view,
the Wisconsin court considers a power of sale in the trustee sufficient to
prevent suspension of the power of alienation of property held in trust.8 5
The result is that trusts in Wisconsin never violate our statute so long
as the trustee has either an express or implied power of sale.8
V. CONCLUSIONS
A review of the cases dealing with the common law rule against
71 Wis. Laws (1925), ch. 287.72Wis. Laws (1927), ch. 341. The present Wisconsin Statutes are set forth,
supra, note 1.
. Supra, note 56.
-4 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902).
75 Ibid., 115 at Wis. 115.
76 Will of Butter, 239 Wis. 249, 1 N.W. 2d 87 (1941).
7 Ibid., 239 Wis. at 255.
- Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 617, 53 N.W. 905 (1892).
79Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33 N.W. 188 (1887).
so First case invalidating a trust is apparently De Wold v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 469,
21 N.W. 615 (1884).
8- Supra, note 74.
82 WIS. STATS. (1951), Sec. 231.19.83 Lamberton v. Pereles, 83 Wis. 449, 58 N.W. 776 (1894).
84 Will of Baker, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W. 2d 94 (1950).
85 Supra, note 74.86 In Will of Walker, supra note 84, the court found an implied power of sale.
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direct restraints on alienation indicates that inalienability of the bene-
ficiary's interest is permissable, under the majority view, where that
interest is no greater than a life estate.8 7 No attempt appears to have
been made to strike down trusts as direct restraints simply because the
trustee's interest is inalienable.88 So it would seem that trusts with no
spendthrift provisions do not violate the common law rule against direct
restraints. In Wisconsin, trusts of income from lands are made in-
alienable by statute but our court considers such trusts valid if the
trustee has a power of sale.8 9 Since most states permit spendthrift trusts
of beneficial life estates the result in Wisconsin does not conflict with the
policy behind the common law rule against direct restraints.
The common law rule against perpetuities invalidates only those
trusts which contains future interests which will not vest within the time
allowed by the rule.90 Under Wisconsin law, future interests in an
ascertained person but contingent upon an uncertain event do not violate
the Wisconsin statute, since a fee simple can be conveyed by persons in
being,91 although such future interests would be void at common law if
they did not vest within lives in being and 21 years.92 This difference
in result is not due to the effect Wisconsin accords to a power of sale
in the trustee but rather to the Wisconsin view that our statute is not
aimed a remoteness in vesting as such.93 It is only with respect to future
interests in unascertained persons that both the Wisconsin statute and
the common law rule apply. Here a power of sale in the trustee saves
future interests in Wisconsin which would be invalid at common law
if too remote in vesting.94 Does the Wisconsin law violate the policy
foundations behind the common law rule against perpetuities when such
future interests are held valid? It is generally recognized that the pur-
pose of the common law rule was and is to promote the practical alien-
ability of land so that if the present owner cannot use the property
advantageously, he can sell it to someone who will make a better use
of it.9- It would seem that this purpose is adequately served by a power
of sale in the trustee. The contrary New York view seems opposed to
the continuance of trusts as such. The Wisconsin court has properly
indicated that any limitation on the duration of trusts as such is a
problem for the legislature. 96
S7 Supra, note 10.
88 RUNDELL, supra, note 27, 250.
89 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902).
90 GRAY, Section 269.
91 Supra, note 89.
92 Supra, note 90.
93 Will of Butter, 239 Wis. 249, 1 N.W. 2d 87 (1941).
94 Will of Walker, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W. 2d 94 (1950).
95 SIMEs, Sec. 439; BOGERT, Sec. 220.
96 Supra, note 94. Justice Vinson's difficulty in attempting to determine how
long accumulation of income by a trustee should be permitted in Gertman v.
1952]
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An additional argument in favor of the Wisconsin rule in a juris-
diction where any trust, whether containing present or future interests,
must comply with the statutory prohibitions is that New York, which
does not follow the Wisconsin rule, has been criticized as being. unduly
restrictive on the creation of trusts. 97 Michigan, which also refused to
follow the Wisconsin rule, 98 recently felt compelled to repeal their
statute and go back to the common law rule.99
LEO M. McDONNELL
Burdick, 123 F. 2d 924 (1941), allustrates the handicaps upon judges who
attempt to determine broad policy questions.
97 GRAY, Sec. 750.
8 Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901).
19 8 MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1949 Cum. Supp.), Sec. 26.49
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